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ilton and Rose Friedman conclude their 1980 book Free to Choose with a
chapter entitled “The Tide Is Turning.” It includes the optimistic state-
ment that “we are waking up.” Americans are “again recognizing the dan-
gers of an overgoverned society, coming to understand that good objectives can
be perverted by bad means, that reliance on the freedom of people to control
their own lives with their own values is the surest way to achieve the full poten-
tial of a great society” (310).
This hopeful statement foreshadowed much of what has happened since
then. A president, more appreciative of markets than any in decades, was elected
in the United States that year, followed in Great Britain by the choice of a market-
oriented prime minister. Ten years after Free to Choose was published, the Berlin
Wall fell. In many ways the tide has indeed turned. The work of the Friedmans
was one of the reasons. 
Their impeccably reasoned arguments in favor of economic freedom, start-
ing in a big and lasting way with Capitalism and Freedom, helped to gradually
bring people in the United States and elsewhere to recognize the importance of
economic freedom. In the United States, beginning in the late 1970s, trucking
deregulation and the freeing of airline prices from regulation both brought size-
able, well-recognized benefits, as did the deregulation of oil prices. In some
places, the move toward economic freedom went further. For example, Roger
Douglas, finance minister in New Zealand’s Labour government beginning in
1984, was able to cut income tax rates in half, deregulate wide sectors of the
New Zealand economy, end farm and business subsidies, and privatize most
state-owned enterprises there. The progress made in nations around the world
was substantial, and in some respects—albeit in fits and starts—the trend con-
tinues. In England, the disasters of postwar socialism were, to a significant
extent, reversed during the Thatcher era.
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But today there is another, growing force at work in the opposite direc-
tion. Against the progress in the understanding of the importance of markets
and economic freedom is running a worrisome tide: the growing impact of reg-
ulatory juggernauts stemming from environmental policy in the United States.
Even as economic regulation in several cases declined, environmental regula-
tion has increased.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
The role of the Friedmans and their books in promoting the public’s
understanding of property rights and markets specifically in the area of envi-
ronmental policy is limited. They did begin their contributions early—with one
of the first statements, perhaps, challenging the need for government support of
a national park. In Capitalism and Freedom (1962, 31) they said about Yellow-
stone: “If the public wants this kind of an activity enough to pay for it, private
enterprises will have every incentive to provide such parks.” And they point out
that unlike the case of city parks, to identify those who enjoy visiting them is
not hard, nor is collecting revenue to support them. We at PERC—Terry Ander-
son and Don Leal in particular—and others have written extensively on how
such a system can work and, as the Friedmans pointed out, has in fact been
working. 
But in 1962 environmental regulation was barely a blip on the radar screen
of even most market-oriented economists. While the blip had grown larger by
1980, the year Free to Choose was published (and, by the way, the year PERC
was founded), other concerns were still much greater for the Friedmans and
most other economists. Yet Milton Friedman (no doubt with the help of Rose)
made yet another contribution to the literature—a contribution that I believe is
having a quiet but profound impact in helping us better recognize, demonstrate,
and control the regulatory role of central governments, including—over time, I
believe—the role of environmental regulation. 
That contribution is the development of the Economic Freedom of the
World (EFW) index. Milton Friedman’s role in that project was, and is, a large
one. Not yet fully recognized is its fundamental importance in helping us learn
about the results of policy alternatives and to settle disagreements on the cen-
tral government’s proper role. One of these disagreements is the government’s
role in environmental policy. 
For those of us interested in environmental policy options, the issue can
be stated this way: Will environmental policy improve when experts from the
central government control more of the nation’s economy? Or will private prop-
erty, protected in courts rather than by a central bureau and traded in markets,
yield better environmental results? Put more appropriately, the question is this:
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environment are hotly debated today. But they are not unlike a set of questions
about prosperity and economic growth that were debated throughout much of
the twentieth century. Now, as then, good economic analysis focuses on the
role of information and on incentives to find and use that information wisely.
We can learn from that long “socialist calculation” debate, and we now
have a tool, the EFW index, that should help us find answers much more
quickly than those to the previously unsettled questions. When economists who
have a good grasp of how theory can help us understand and answer the real-
world questions at hand, the index and its components, applied country by
country along with other information, have great potential. They can be used to
clarify and quantify the impact of “freedom to choose” and other 
policy options as they influence not only economic growth but other measures
of human well-being, including environmental indicators—from health and
longevity to the disappearance of species. 
HISTORY AND ITS LESSONS
Beginning around 1920, a number of economists took part in what is now
known as the socialist calculation debate over the productivity and, indeed, the
feasibility of socialism. Ludwig von Mises and later F. A. Hayek were prominent
in arguing that when governmental control replaced private property rights and
markets, the quality of decisions would fall. Relative prices set in open markets
would no longer be available to guide efficient production or even to identify
the most appropriate goods to produce. Von Mises and Hayek questioned the
ability of central planners to give rational guidance to the economy without the
information generated and constantly updated by the price system that emerges
from market trading of privately owned rights. Without true markets, how could
planning really be rational? 
It was not until decades later that many economists came to understand
the importance of what von Mises and Hayek said. The centrally directed plan-
ning model seemed productive to many, perhaps most, economists until
recently. For example, in 1985 the popular introductory economics textbook of
Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus put it this way: “The Soviet model had
surely demonstrated that a command economy is capable of mobilizing
resources for rapid growth and awesome military power.” They did note that it
had been done “in an atmosphere of great human sacrifice—even loss of life—
and political repression.” Whether the sacrifice was worth it, they said, was “one
of the most profound dilemmas of human society” (Samuelson and Nordhaus
1985, 776). The basic lessons taught by von Mises, Hayek, and the Friedmans
are slow to be absorbed, it would seem. Indeed, the teaching is tragically slow
for people living under badly flawed systems—and for those of us living under
governments that were importing some of those flaws.76 Richard L. Stroup
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union (and
with it the governments of many of its satellite nations), the same authors said
much the same thing in the 1995 edition of their book, but the advantage of
markets was now recognized. Samuelson and Nordhaus wrote that “it appears
that in the modern world of open borders and high-quality manufactured goods,
the blunt control of the command economy could not match the finely tuned
incentives and innovation of a market economy” (716). The “finely tuned incen-
tives,” of course, come from the price system. When costly but successful inno-
vation brings personal rewards to those who make it happen, more innovation
is encouraged. When higher quality products earn a higher price, higher qual-
ity goods become more available. These signals and incentives are systemati-
cally missing from the socialist system. 
With the fall of the Iron Curtain, observers could see the devastation left
by the central planning systems. Markets came to be more appreciated and thus
more utilized in the production of goods and services in much of the world.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, however, market socialists
were viewed as winners of the intellectual debates, and the tide of history
seemed to be on their side. According to Robert Heilbroner, who favored the
socialist viewpoint, the debate was seemingly settled in 1940 by Oskar Lange
(whom Heilbroner calls a “brilliant young economist”). Lange contended that a
central planning board could solve the problem of economic calculation by
keeping an eye on inventories and changing prices in response to changes in
inventories (Heilbroner 1990).
The bleak outlook for capitalism led to the formation in 1947 of the Mont
Pelerin Society, with Hayek as the founding president. Milton Friedman was a
founding member and served as president from 1970 to 1972. The goal of the
society, according to its web page (see www.montpelerin.org), was to “facilitate
an exchange of ideas between like-minded scholars in the hope of strengthen-
ing the principles and practice of a free society and to study the workings,
virtues, and defects of market-oriented economic systems.” The society’s “state-
ment of aims” laid out their urgent concerns:
Over large stretches of the earth’s surface the essential conditions of human
dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are under con-
stant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy. The
position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively under-
mined by extensions of arbitrary power. (www.montpelerin.org)
Members of the Mont Pelerin Society set about trying to put their concerns
into action. An important manifestation of this goal was the publication in 1962
of Capitalism and Freedom, an extraordinary book for the time. It stirred inter-
est and built support for the idea that economic decisions should be made by
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governments. The major effects of Capitalism and Freedom were probably pri-
marily on young people at the time and future leaders—including Ronald Reagan.
However, the impact did not become fully visible until many years later. The
logic was sound and convincing to many readers, but despite Milton Friedman’s
strong background in statistics, clear cross-country comparisons of the sort he
was later to help make feasible were not yet available to make more obvious
and more concrete the value of the points made in the book.
Decades later, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, the substance of
what von Mises, Hayek, and the Friedmans had written became more obvious.
By 1993, Heilbroner could write:
Socialism—defined as a centrally planned economy in which the govern-
ment controls all means of production—was the tragic failure of the twenti-
eth century. Born of a commitment to remedy the economic and moral
defects of capitalism, it has far surpassed capitalism in both economic mal-
function and moral cruelty. Yet the idea and the ideal of socialism linger on.
Later in the same article he recognizes the source of the problem and what
is needed to solve it:
The main obstacle to real perestroika is the impossibility of creating a work-
ing market system without a firm basis of private ownership, and it is clear
that the creation of such a basis encounters the opposition of the former
state bureaucracy and the hostility of ordinary people who have long been
trained to be suspicious of the pursuit of wealth.
The basic lesson of von Mises, Hayek, and the Friedmans had been
learned by a formerly dedicated supporter of socialism. But without the avail-
ability of statistical tests and demonstrations using international data of the kind
made available on a systematic basis today by the EFW index, the lessons had
taken decades to be widely absorbed.
ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD INDEX
In the mid-1980s, Milton Friedman and Michael Walker, executive director
of the Fraser Institute in Vancouver, Canada, began a project to help explain the
various aspects of economic freedom. Most of all, the goal was to figure out
ways to measure economic freedom and to determine the consistency of each
government in providing or allowing them. Once the measures were identified,
it would be possible to estimate the effects of the policies measured. Supported
by the Liberty Fund, Friedman and Walker convened a series of six meetings of
economists from 1986 to 1994. The goal was to devise ways to measure the eco-
nomic freedom that was of such great concern to them, to the Mont Pelerin
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distinguished economists participated, including Nobel laureates Gary Becker
and Douglass North. 
The key product at the end of the series of meetings was the Economic
Freedom of the World index. The first version of the index was published in
1996 by James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and Walter Block. With the help of
classical liberal institutes worldwide, they are seeking more and better data.
Aided by continued guidance from Michael Walker and Milton Friedman, Gwart-
ney and Lawson regularly update, improve, and extend the index.
The EFW index ranks economic freedom in 123 nations on the basis of
objective, published, and available data. These data are selected to determine
the extent to which (in the words of the latest EFW report) each country has
institutions and policies that “provide an infrastructure for voluntary exchange”
and “protect individuals and their property from aggressors seeking to use violence,
coercion, and fraud to seize things that do not belong to them” (Gwartney and
Lawson 2003, 5). Those in a country who seize things that do not belong to
them may—and often do—include the government. Some of the criteria for
economic freedom, of course, involve restraining the powers of those in gov-
ernment. The EFW index includes criteria data in five areas: the size of govern-
ment, the legal structure and the security of property rights, access to sound
money, freedom to exchange with foreigners, and regulation of credit, labor,
and business. 
When a nation’s EFW index number is high, the market is playing a larger
role relative to political control of the economy. More decisions are being made
privately, coordinated in markets with less interference from government. This
does not mean, however, that the government’s role is less important; it is
merely less extensive in scope, exerting little direct control over economic 
decisions. An essential role for government in a market economy is its protec-
tive function: the protection of persons and their property from theft, fraud, and
violence.
Where the legal structure and security of property rights are stronger, gov-
ernment is doing a crucial job well, and the EFW index reflects this in a higher
measured degree of economic freedom. Thus, the EFW index is valuable in
research to help settle the arguments of the sort that propelled the socialist cal-
culation debate.
The EFW index enables researchers to examine, and to demonstrate con-
vincingly, how the economic freedom of a country affects that country’s pros-
perity, growth, and poverty. A capsule view of the impact of economic freedom
on these variables is given in the 2003 version of the index:
Economic freedom is highly correlated with per-capita income, economic
growth, and life expectancy. Increased economic freedom does not lead to
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the bottom quintile of economic freedom receive 2.27% of total income in
their nations; in nations in the fourth quintile, the bottom 10% receive 2.66%
of total income; in the third quintile, 2.25%; in the second quintile, 2.83%;
and in the top quintile, 2.68%. The actual income of poor people increases
as nations gain in economic freedom because of the increased wealth eco-
nomic freedom generates. The average per-capita income of the poorest 10%
of people in nations in the bottom quintile is US$873 compared to US$6,681
for those in the top quintile.
This statement from the authors reflects the results of more than 135
papers (including several by Gwartney and Lawson), published in refereed jour-
nals, that use the EFW index or its components to explain various outcomes in
the real world. The web site of the project (www.freetheworld.com) lists these
publications along with several working papers and links directly to many of
them. These articles and book chapters cover the impact of economic freedom
on an even broader range of variables, from income to intellectual property and
public health and the environment, typically accounting also for many other
influences, sometimes including political freedom.
ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Today, the importance of markets for prosperity and growth is being more
widely recognized, but the role of markets in the environment is still often neg-
lected. Economics principles texts most often discuss environmental problems
as “market failure.” The problem, of course, is that markets perform their func-
tion only when property rights are well-defined, enforced, and tradable. When
the property rights of individuals—their rights against anyone who would vio-
late their rights by theft, fraud, violence, or pollution—are not properly defined
or defended, the fault does not lie with the market (which in this case is non-
existent). It may, instead, lie with the government that failed to protect citizens
against rights violations by others in society. 
Environmental harms occur when there is no protection for individuals
and their property against damage, including environmental damage. Yet the
“market failure” explanation for environmental problems is common, and much
environmental policy in the United States and around the world today is
destructive both of property rights and of the market approach. Control by the
government, especially the central government, is more and more the policy
approach adopted.
Just as the economists of the twentieth century debated the question of
collective vs. private control, a key debate today is over the question of whether
increased governmental control helps or harms the environment in which we
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the question, without relying entirely on trial and error, which took many
decades in the case of socialism in the last century. 
One way to research options for answering this question is to examine the
effects of decreased economic freedom (that is, more government control) on
the condition of our environment. A large number of articles and books with
case studies have been published in the past, but more recently, data series such
as the EFW index offer insight. 
So far, only a few studies have been done on environmental questions using
the EFW index. It is an area ripe for additional study. But studies have examined
the effects of economic freedom, or some of its components, on some environ-
mental measures in some groups of nations. These are statistical studies using
economic freedom and an independent or explanatory variable. For example, in
a chapter in Who Owns the Environment? economist Seth Norton (Norton 1998a)
found that in nations where property rights (as measured by the EFW compo-
nent) are strong, various measures of environmental quality (as measured by
World Bank data) are higher than in nations in which property rights are weak. 
Norton used three other measures of property rights that led to similar
results and the same conclusion, and the results were statistically significant.
Access to clean water, sanitation measures, life expectancy, and deforestation all
are more favorable in nations with stronger private property rights. When prop-
erty rights were well protected, for example, about 90 percent of the popula-
tion had access to safe water; but in nations with weak property rights, only
about 60 percent of the people had that key health advantage.
Norton (1998b) has also examined the impacts of property rights on the
poorest people of the world. One measure of poverty he used was the United
Nations’ Human Poverty Index (HPI), which includes the environmentally
related elements of longevity as well as access to safe water, among other meas-
ures of well-being. The HPI is a distinctive database that considers the condi-
tions of only the most deprived people in a nation’s communities. Using this
database, Norton finds that the influence of stronger property rights is substan-
tial and positive: “Where property rights are strong, the HPI is substantially
reduced,” he writes, and “weak rights are associated with greater deprivation for
the world’s impoverished” (239). For poor people in poor nations (as Norton
had found across nations in general), stronger property rights, an important
component of economic freedom, improve the environment, health, and other
aspects of citizens’ lives.
POLITICAL FREEDOM AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The EFW index and similar databases have allowed researchers to provide
evidence that economic freedom leads to higher environmental quality. Even in
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economic freedom in favor of political control of environmental decisionmak-
ing can reduce environmental quality. Indeed, a number of case studies have
shown that moving away from property rights protected by the common law
toward statutory pollution policy with environmental regulations administered
bureaucratically has allowed special interests to capture parts of the regulatory
regime for their own advantage, sometimes to the detriment of the environment. 
In 1981, Ackerman and Hassler showed in Clean Coal, Dirty Air that the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 were shaped by Eastern high-sulfur coal
interests. These companies and miners’ unions successfully pressured Congress
to specify the use of scrubbers, which virtually required the use of high-sulfur
coal in coal-fired electric power plants—even where lower-sulfur coal would
have been cheaper and would have reduced sulfur emissions by greater
amounts. Economic freedom was reduced in the name of air quality improve-
ments, and in some cases the air was made dirtier as well. Even with scrubbers
in place, high-sulfur coal could produce more sulfur oxides than a new plant
burning clean coal would have done. The democratic process had changed
environmental policy, but not for the better. 
In his book The Political Limits of Environmental Regulation (1989), Bruce
Yandle showed how pressure to replace common law with statute-based regu-
lations came not primarily from victims of pollution but from special interest
groups often seeking advantage over their competitors. Such regulations are
brought about politically in a democracy, but they cannot be expected to be
efficient or cost-effective in improving environmental quality. 
Elizabeth Brubaker (1998) has revealed that in Canada, too, rent-seeking
special interests used the democratic process to gain for themselves at the
expense of the environment. In an earlier book (1995), she compiled impres-
sive evidence that Canada’s movement away from property rights and common
law to government regulation under statute had, on balance, degraded that
nation’s air and water resources.
Michael Stroup, in a recent working paper, affirms the environmental bene-
fits of economic freedom for industrialized countries, using data from the thirty
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations. His
paper has an interesting twist that lends support to the idea that political con-
trol can hurt the environment on balance, not only in the case of poor and
socialist nations, but also in a modern democracy. Stroup studied the impact of
economic freedom on each OECD nation’s emissions (measured per unit of eco-
nomic activity) of four air pollutants: sulfur oxides, oxides of nitrogen, visible
particulates, and carbon dioxide. Using multiple regression analysis to account
for other factors, and studying four time periods from 1980 to 1995, he finds that
these measures of environmental performance improve when economic free-
dom, as measured by the EFW index, is greater.
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ing the ability of citizens democratically to influence the nation’s policies,
including environmental policies. He finds that for more than half of all OECD
countries, more political freedom (that is, more democratic political influence)
leads to more air emissions per unit of output, not less. Indeed, he points out
that “a greater level of political freedom within an OECD country tends to
decrease the level of all four types of air pollution per dollar of GDP only when
the level of economic freedom in that country is relatively low” (23). 
Worldwide, political freedom gives all citizens an influence over govern-
ment, including policy on the environment. Usually, this is a force for a better
environmental outcome because governmental leaders are being held politically
accountable for their actions. But when economic freedom is high, then there
is much to lose, and more political freedom can work to the advantage of spe-
cial interests. If the environment already is relatively clean, then democracy
leaves a good deal of room for mischief by rent-seekers. It appears both from
case study data and from Stroup’s results that while the effect of economic free-
dom on environmental quality is consistently positive, the positive environ-
mental effect of political freedom is conditional on the absence of a high level
of economic freedom. When elected officials are not constrained by strong con-
stitutional limits, the democratic political system can be used to transfer rents at
the cost of other goods, including environmental quality.
GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT
Although the relative roles of economic freedom and political freedom on
environmental quality are beginning to be understood, the evidence is limited
in quantity and coverage. At this point, few are knowledgeable and even fewer
are persuaded that property rights and markets have strong advantages over the
regulatory state in the case of the environment. The situation cries out for more
complete and more thorough research, as evidenced by the fact that environ-
mental policies continue to move away from reliance on property rights and
economic freedom, toward regulatory decisions and control. 
To conduct this research properly, it is necessary to have a more complete
theoretical treatment of the problems than we see in most classrooms, where
the “market failure” paradigm so often rules. The importance of property rights
is becoming better known in the context of the environment, but public choice
insights are seldom integrated into discussions of the environment, and the
same is true of the information problem that was the focus of Austrian econo-
mists von Mises and Hayek. The better-informed theory is needed both to for-
mulate testable hypotheses and to help researchers identify and assemble the
necessary databases, just as the EFW process did over many years with the help
of dozens of accomplished and experienced economists. This section seeks to
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by intelligent, hard-working public servants dedicated to their missions, turn out
to be so costly and yet, too often, actually harm the environment? If property
rights and markets are the basic policy in a nation like Canada or the United
States, why might more involvement by democratic government lead, arguably,
to worse results? Several factors can help explain this.
1. As in the problem of socialist calculation in the former Soviet
Union, regulators face the problem of information that is missing due to
the lack of market trading. They also lack incentives to find and utilize
the information needed for effective, cost-efficient regulation, especially
when finding it is difficult and using it is costly.
To begin with, resources are limited, so regulators must decide how to pri-
oritize environmental problems. Identifying the worst chemical risks or deter-
mining which species should be protected first is complex and difficult. Opin-
ions will differ, and there is no market in which people who feel strongly about
one position or another can bid for what they want. 
Once a priority is set, regulators must decide how best to reach the goal.
But once again, there is no lineup of offers from competing suppliers—to clean
up at a given cost, say, or to provide habitat for a given animal or suite of
species. And because we cannot compare the cost of offers to supply against
offers to pay for what is supplied, there is no way to identify a stopping point
where further action toward that goal is too costly to be warranted by the ben-
efits produced.
There is, however, a regulator who, like his counterpart in a socialistic sys-
tem, orders people to do something—to clean up chemicals or provide habitat
without payment. Of course, a regulatory order that simply stops a proven vio-
lation of someone else’s rights is an appropriate order without payment. But
unlike a complainant asking relief against a polluter under common law, the
typical regulator normally faces no burden of proof in determining whether a
person’s rights have been violated. The regulator often operates with what Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer has called “tunnel vision” (Breyer 1993). The regulator sees
clearly only the task at hand, not the costs imposed on others by a regulation.
This regulator has little incentive to hold back on using regulatory authority
even though more costly responses are required to produce still more safety (or
more habitat). The cost is usually borne by the regulated party, so the regula-
tor has an incentive to seek even small improvements with high costs. Exces-
sive regulation can result. On the other hand, if a politically organized special
interest demands that the regulator divert his attention to other issues, regula-
tors may well go along. Why pay a high cost to fight back? Better, perhaps, from
the regulator’s viewpoint to seek other margins to reduce the risk being regu-
lated, to avoid conflict with a politically important regulated party. In such
cases, regulation may be too lax to protect the public from serious risks.84 Richard L. Stroup
A well-documented case where tunnel vision leads to regulations tight
enough to harm the environmental mission is the case of land-use regulations
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). As currently applied, the ESA can be
quite costly to landowners, giving them negative incentives to protect species.
The possibly draconian penalties that landowners will experience as a result of
using their land while having endangered species on the property lead them to
change their land management. They can usually find easy ways to modify their
habitat to reduce the likelihood that the listed species will find it attractive and
thus be present. 
Landowners naturally prefer to maintain management authority. Under the
current rules, the populations affected are likely to be seriously harmed by such
preemptive habitat modification. Each landowner has reason to learn what a
listed species in the area likes or needs, to tweak land management practices to
make what that species likes largely unavailable, and to inform neighbors about
these practices. A resident population of an endangered species can lead the
Fish and Wildlife Service to impose land management controls under the ESA.
Both anecdotal (Stroup 1995) and statistical evidence (Lueck and Michael 2003)
support this conclusion. The penalties of the ESA give landowners an incentive
to manage their land against the listed species.
2. In a private setting, Coasian bargaining reduces the costs of
reaching objectives, but such opportunities are typically lacking in a reg-
ulatory setting.
Once a regulatory decision is made, there is typically no legitimate way to
bargain around it. A regulatory decision that costs the regulated party $10,000 but
produces just $1,000 worth of benefits to the regulator’s mission is wasteful, but
it is likely to stand because the regulator achieves the benefit and doesn’t pay
the cost. Contrast this with the private sector. After a disputed property right is
adjudicated and the right is determined, that right will still tend to flow to the high-
est-valued user—even if the right was not awarded to the highest-valued user. If
the polluter owes a duty to stop the polluting activity, but stopping costs $10,000
while accepting the pollution would only cost the receptor $1,000, then we can
expect the polluter to buy permission to pollute from the receptor at a bargained
price higher than $1,000 but lower than $10,000. Neither inefficient pollution nor
inefficient control need occur, if polluter and receptor find trading to be mutu-
ally beneficial. And when values later change, then the retrading of rights can
allow peaceful and efficient adjustment. But under statutory regulation, when
such exchange is typically not allowed, even the most inefficient order must be
followed. That follows in part from the fact that even citizens not materially
affected by the pollution may be allowed to enter the case as “stakeholders.” In
this case, trading to reduce the cost of pollution plus the cost of control is not
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the pollution has some value, however small, but their voices may have public
policy impacts out of proportion to any damages they might suffer.
Because in a market ownership rights can be traded or retained at will,
there is little incentive in a market for either a buyer or a seller to posture or
adopt sanctimonious attitudes and condemn other user demands as frivolous, as
so often happens in discussions over the use of politically controlled lands, such
as federal lands in the United States. An experience of the National Audubon
Society illustrates the contrast between the constructive nature of private nego-
tiations and the contentious nature of political discussions.
Officials of the Audubon Society are outspoken and hostile in their argu-
ments against oil drilling on a federal wildlife refuge in Alaska. Yet they have
worked comfortably and peaceably with the private oil company that they have
allowed to produce natural gas on the Paul J. Rainey Preserve, which the
National Audubon Society owns in Louisiana (Snyder and Shaw 1995). Gas was
extracted only after the producers met Audubon’s strict stipulations. Audubon
used the resulting revenue to enhance its mission on the refuge and elsewhere.
Audubon has the right to determine what happens on its land, and it has strong
incentives to avoid risking the loss of support from its members by allowing
damage to the habitat it owns; but it also has the right to gain support for its
mission by producing petroleum. Audubon’s mission can be given a net gain by
natural gas revenues that contribute more than the tiny losses to existing habi-
tat resulting from the careful petroleum extraction procedures.
Without trade, results are less efficient. This reduced efficiency harms envi-
ronmental quality and environmental policy in two ways. First, less efficiency
reduces wealth, and when wealth declines, the willingness and ability of those
affected to demand environmental quality decline. This income or wealth effect
has been estimated by Donald Coursey to be 2.5 times as strong as the change in
income causing the income effect. The estimated income elasticity of demand, that
is, is 2.5. Second, an environmental policy that is less efficient has a price effect,
too. The policy delivers less “bang for the buck,” and voters will demand less of
a policy when the cost of that policy’s results costs them more (Coursey 1993).
3. Public decisions are public goods: Accountability in the public
sector is largely missing as a result, and free riders are evident at every level.
Gordon Tullock made this point more than thirty years ago (Tullock 1971,
Stroup 2000). The most fundamental reason for poor accountability in govern-
ment and the presence of free riders is that voters are rationally ignorant. An
individual, knowing that one person does not determine the outcome of an
election, is likely to spend more time and attention deciding which car to buy—
or even which tennis racket—than on which candidate to support. This is a
rational choice for the individual, but it also means that voters are not able to
hold government responsible in an informed way.86 Richard L. Stroup
The impact on environmental policy can be seen through some interesting
research about how people respond to risks. It is well known in the risk analy-
sis community that members of the general public systematically underestimate
common and significant risks but overestimate small environmental risks of the
sort commonly regulated. But this bias disappears when the risks that each per-
son is asked to estimate are the specific kind that person faces, as when an eld-
erly person is asked to estimate the risk of death from a slip and fall, a common
danger only for older people (Benjamin and Dougan 1997). People know much
more about risks commonly faced by themselves, their families, or their friends.
In contrast, as voters they affect government decisions about many matters on
which they are largely ignorant. Thus, putting voters in general in charge of envi-
ronmental risks guarantees that the risk management system—voters are ulti-
mately in charge of the system—will be “flying blind” much of the time. 
The “free rider” problem of public policy has many implications. With the
public largely uninformed, special interests and “stakeholders” can use activist
tactics and the resulting publicity to stop a policy they do not like. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, for example, has been shown to make decisions
influenced by press coverage of its proposed rules (Yates and Stroup 2000). Sim-
ilarly, federal regulators respond to media coverage when deciding about pub-
lic lands. In contrast, if the stakeholders had some true ownership, so they could
sell their interests and other stakeholders could not step in, then quite possibly
the stakeholders could reach a mutually beneficial result. But instead, non-owners
are allowed to usurp some of the rights of “owners,” and almost anyone is con-
sidered a “stakeholder” and has the standing needed to bring on a de facto veto
of use. In the case of the Alaskan wildlife reserve, the National Audubon Society
gives up nothing when it helps to stop trade and prevent drilling and produc-
tion by oil producers. Unlike the case of a preserve it owns, it does not give up
money or other value when it acts to stop drilling on federal lands.
Decisions will be wiser when they are made privately by individuals who
gain personally and substantially from their own resource conservation and pay
the major cost personally when they waste resources. Where regulation is the
only realistic option, however—think of auto air pollution in the Los Angeles
basin—devolution of regulation to the lowest possible level can concentrate both
benefits and costs closer to where the decisionmakers live and the knowledge
base of the relevant citizens is better, enabling them to hold their local govern-
ment more accountable. Relying on common law—using the courts to protect
individual rights—will also lead to better information, when reliance is feasible.
Because common law demands a burden of proof and follows standards of evi-
dence, information that will stand up to cross-examination is necessary to bring
the force of the law to bear. In contrast, the publicity campaigns that affect gov-
ernmental regulatory decisions have no such burdens of proof. Instead, cheap
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4. A good produced in the private sector is likely to be better, as
judged by its users, than the same good produced in the public sector.
The Friedmans were right when, as noted above, they wrote about Yel-
lowstone: “If the public wants this kind of an activity enough to pay for it, pri-
vate enterprises will have every incentive to provide such parks.” Not only do
private enterprises have an incentive to provide goods and services such as
parks, but private provision tends to provide greater benefits as well. That is
because those who pay—and in the private sector, visitors usually pay the full
cost of the services they receive—will control. Where customers pay, we can
expect the goods and services to be better targeted to those who want them
most and to be provided more cost-effectively. Evidence from state parks,
where customers pay a much larger portion of the total costs than in national
parks, supports this expectation. 
Research at PERC by Donald Leal and Holly Fretwell has shown that fiscal
difficulties have been causing both national and state parks to move toward
more reliance on revenues received from user fees and from ancillary suppliers
to users—such as concessionaires. “New Hampshire and Vermont state parks
are already self-supporting, and a growing number of others are headed in that
direction. An entrepreneurial spirit has taken hold in Texas, South Dakota, and
Arkansas. Park managers have developed a myriad of new programs, activities
and events for which they charge affordable fees. The response has been posi-
tive. Visitation has increased, and so have revenues” (PERC 2003). When park
managers derive their support from visitors and other voluntary supporters, they
are motivated to provide those supporters with good services and products at a
low cost. 
A large natural experiment was conducted two centuries ago that is rele-
vant to this discussion of private versus public provision, even though it was not
directly related to environmental policies. Economist Kelly Olds, in a 1994 Jour-
nal of Political Economy article, discussed the impact of “disestablishment” of
state churches in the United States. Around 1800, one state at a time, the young
nation turned away from state churches. All tax support of churches was ended.
A surprising thing happened—surprising to many of us, anyway: Church atten-
dance, church budgets, and the number of preachers did not shrink; instead, all
grew substantially. (Olds examined Connecticut and Massachusetts in detail.) 
To this day, America is one of the few industrial democracies without a
state-supported church. America is also far and away the leader in church atten-
dance in this group of nations and the leader in religiosity. When society turned
to the market order rather than government support, preachers, church leaders,
and small groups of those most concerned and most faithful swung into action.
Religion lost government support but gained far more. There is no mystery
about why. A private church or a club is not run by the average voter or by the
deliberations of a legislature. It is run by those who care most about the church88 Richard L. Stroup
or club and its mission. As a result, churches are more diverse and better oper-
ated, and the survivors thrive. 
CONCLUSION
The four points made above on government involvement should help us
to see the pitfalls in turning more and more authority over to centralized gov-
ernment as nations become richer and demand ever-increasing environmental
quality. While regulation often seems to be a way to obtain what we want at
low cost, these points suggest that the actual results of new regulations may run
counter to their stated intentions, as happened with socialism in the twentieth
century and as happens today with environmental regulation. Accountability for
costs and rewards for benefits generated are hard to achieve in government.
We at PERC are dedicated to the belief that while policy is seldom made
by economists, nor made just as they would recommend, economists and their
ideas do have serious consequences over time. It is worth doing the economic
research, doing it well, and doing it extensively in policy-relevant areas. The
EFW index and the research based on it are models for what is needed in the
new intellectual wars over the socialist model of centralized control now being
applied in the name of the environment.
Today, we must ask whether the tide is turning back from the progress
brought on after many decades of intellectual battle by von Mises, Hayek, and
the Friedmans. After decades of suffering by millions of people—suffering
noticed by most of the world only after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fail-
ure of socialist nations—nations became more free; but will that freedom con-
tinue to grow? 
On the bright side, there is evidence of continuing progress. The EFW
2003 annual report states: “Economic freedom continues to gain ground around
the world” (Gwartney and Lawson 2003). Lessons learned from the painful
decades of abuse heaped on citizens by socialist leaders, plus the knowledge
from research based on the EFW index and similar indices, are having a real and
continuing effect. 
One place where the picture is not so bright, however, and where the tide
is probably running the other way, is environmental policy. The claim is made
that market failure is at the root of environmental problems and that market
replacement by tighter governmental controls is the best solution. 
These claims must be answered. Even at these early stages, the results
from research based on the EFW index and its components, and on similar
indices, are heartening. They verify what Milton and Rose Friedman, as well as
other classical liberals including the researchers at PERC, have been saying
about the usefulness of private property rights and the markets. Environmental
protection and conservation depend upon the incentives provided by privateEconomic Freedom and Environmental Quality 89
property rights and the exchange of rights through markets. To spread this mes-
sage widely, much more work must be done, of just the sort done so well by
the Friedmans over the past several decades.
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